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A variety of infectious agents can be transmitted from
health-care workers to patients (1,2). Certain of these agents
are transmissible through the air, which means that
transmission from health-care workers can occur in spite of
standard infection control measures such as handwashing.
Thus, airborne transmission increases the likelihood that an
outbreak can occur. While it is well known that health-care
workers can transmit infections such as tuberculosis,
varicella, and influenza by the airborne route, it is less well
appreciated that they can also transmit certain bacterial
pathogens through the air.
Bacteria transmissible through the air for which no data
support transmission by health-care workers include
Clostridium diphtheriae, Haemophilus influenzae, Neisseria
meningiditis, Streptococcus pneumoniae, and Yersinia pestis.
For all these agents except S. pneumoniae, the epidemiologic
data supporting airborne transmission are strong enough
that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
recommends that infected patients be placed on droplet
precautions (3). However, for all five agents, no episodes are
well documented of health-care workers transmitting such
infections to other patients by the airborne route, perhaps
because workers with such infections may be too sick to work.
For three other bacteria, Bordetella pertussis, Streptococcus
pyogenes, and Staphylococcus aureus, strong data support
airborne transmission from health-care workers to patients.
Bordetella pertussis
Although most children are vaccinated against B. pertussis
and the vaccine is quite effective up to age 12, approximately
50% of adults are nonimmune (4). Thus, in a vaccinated
population, transmission of pertussis is primarily from adults
to either nonimmune children (<1 year of age) or to adults
whose immunity has waned. Several well-described hospital
outbreaks of pertussis have occurred in which B. pertussis was
thought to be transmitted to or from health-care workers in a
manner suggesting airborne transmission (Table 1) (5-9).
Most hospital outbreaks have involved pediatric patients
(5,6,8,9), but at least one outbreak has occurred in a nursing
home (7). No prolonged carrier state has been identified
(10,11), and transmission is most likely associated with active
symptoms, particularly coughing (12). The use of air samplers
and polymerase chain reaction analysis has shown that
B. pertussis DNA can be found in the air surrounding patients
with  B. pertussis infection, providing further evidence of
airborne spread (13). Terminating B. pertussis hospital
outbreaks involves removing symptomatic health-care
workers from clinical care, isolating symptomatic or exposed
patients, and treating symptomatic and exposed health-care
workers and patients with antibiotics.
Group A Streptococcus pyogenes (GAS)
Health-care worker-associated GAS outbreaks attrib-
uted to airborne spread are uncommon, associated only with
asymptomatic health-care workers, and involving only
surgical site infections (14-18). The health-care workers
carrying GAS may be present during surgery (e.g.,
anesthesiologist, operating room nurse) (16,17) or not present
at all (e.g., medical attendant, operating room technician)
(14,15,18). In five GAS outbreaks associated with health-care
workers (Table 2), volumetric or settle plate air cultures
showed that the health-care workers dispersed GAS into the
air. Sites of GAS colonization identified on the health-care
workers include the rectum, vagina, and skin. The
mechanism by which GAS becomes airborne is not entirely
clear and could include increased activity (14), friction with
clothing, or, in the case of an anesthesiologist who was a rectal
carrier, flatulence. Such outbreaks may cause substantial
illness and even death. Termination of GAS health-care
worker-associated outbreaks requires eradicating the carrier
state with antibiotics. In some cases eradication has been
difficult because the health-care workers’ family was also
colonized with GAS, which may have led to initial treatment
failure.
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Table 1. Hospital Bordetella pertussis outbreaks involving health-care
workers and possible airborne transmission
Health-
  care Other Infected
workers adults   Patient patients
Reference   (no.)  (no.) population    (no.)
Kurt (5)   5 1 Pediatrics 2
  4 0 Pediatrics 0
Linneman (6) 13 0 Pediatrics 6
Addis (7)   5 0 Nursing Home 4
Christie (8) 87 0 Pediatrics 1
Nouvellon (9)   1 0 Pediatrics 1242 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 7, No. 2, March–April 2001
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Staphyloccoccus aureus
Factors affecting the airborne dispersal of S. aureus have
been studied more intensively than those of any other
organism. In the general population, airborne dispersal of
S. aureus is uncommon and appears to be quantitatively
related to the number of S. aureus colonizing the anterior
nares (19). Up to 10% of healthy S. aureus nasal carriers
disperse the organism into the air (20), and females are much
less likely to disperse the organism than males (21,22). Such
airborne dispersers typically were surrounded by 0.01 to 0.1
CFU/m3 of S. aureus and, rarely, as high as 2.6 CFU/m3
(21,22). Hare and Thomas demonstrated that when agar
plates were held directly under the noses of nasal carriers of
S. aureus, airborne dispersal was insignificant with nasal
breathing, counting, coughing 6 times, or sneezing once (23).
Only with snorting did substantial dispersal occur. In
contrast, when the same volunteers were moving, large
numbers of S. aureus were dispersed into the air. This
dispersal was attributed to S. aureus on the skin and clothing,
thought to be liberated into the air by friction and movement.
Coughing increases airborne dispersal of organisms other
than S. aureus, and lack of airborne dispersal of S. aureus
through coughing is thought to be due to its rare presence in
the oropharyngeal cavity. In other studies, talking increased
dispersal of organisms other than S. aureus, and sneezing
dramatically increased the number of bacteria dispersed into
the air, including S. aureus (24,25). Ehrenkranz demon-
strated that oral tetracycline caused the number of S. aureus
in the nose of a nasal carrier of tetracycline-resistant S.
aureus to increase by tenfold and concommitantly increased
the number of S. aureus dispersed into the air (26).
In detailed studies of S. aureus transmission in a
newborn nursery setting (27,28), Rammelkamp et al. found
that newborn infants exposed to nurses who handled
colonized infants acquired S. aureus 14% of the time if good
handwashing was performed and 43% of the time in the
absence of good handwashing (presumed direct contact
transmission). Infants acquired S. aureus 10% of the time
when they were exposed to nurses who were not colonized
with S. aureus and who did not handle infants colonized with
S. aureus (presumed airborne transmission). Under these
controlled circumstances, airborne transmission was about
two thirds as likely as contact transmission. The infants
infected by presumed airborne transmission were four times
more likely to acquire the organism first in their noses than
were the infants infected by direct contact (4/16 vs. 3/49;
p=0.056). During a 3-year period, Nobel demonstrated that a
few patients (8/3,675) were associated with airborne dispersal
of  S. aureus (29). One of eight dispersers identified was
associated with an outbreak. While inactive, such patients
were associated with air counts of up to 0.3 CFU/m3 air. The
highest number of S. aureus in the air was found in
association with bedmaking of colonized patients (up to 4.9
CFU/m3). Elevated airborne dispersal has also been
associated with individual patients (30,31). Hare and Cooke
found that airborne dispersal was facilitated by eczema,
mycosis fungoids, or perineal carriage (31). In a few published
outbreaks, health-care workers have been identified who
clearly dispersed S. aureus into the air (32,33); in one case,
dispersal was thought to be due to heavy skin colonization
with  S. aureus (15). In other outbreaks where airborne
transmission has been suspected, no air cultures were
performed, so the contribution of airborne transmission was
not determined (34,35). Thus, although airborne dispersal
from both patients and health-care workers occurs, under the
circumstances previously studied, it is relatively uncommon.
However, outbreaks associated with such airborne
dispersers are frequent (>10%) (29,32). Clearly, if some factor
augments the ability of S. aureus carriers to produce airborne
dispersal, the potential for S. aureus outbreaks to occur might
be greatly increased. In 1960, the American Journal of
Diseases of Children preceded an article with a brief editorial
entitled “The Preposterous Cloud Baby” (36). The first
sentence of the introduction stated “Once in a blue moon a
journal is privileged to publish an article which introduces an
important revolutionary concept.” In the report that followed,
Eichenwald et al. described a group of S. aureus-colonized,
virally infected newborn infants who had the ability to
disperse S. aureus from their noses into the air—so-called
“cloud babies” (36). These researchers demonstrated by
culture and epidemiologic study that a viral upper respiratory
infection (e.g., with adenovirus or echo virus) was the
essential “cloud factor.” Up to 75% of newborn infants who
carried  S. aureus nasally became cloud babies once they
acquired a viral upper respiratory infection. Most impor-
tantly, these cloud babies were also capable of causing
S. aureus outbreaks (36). Although these infants had no
greater risk for staphylococcal infection, the families of cloud
babies had a fourfold higher risk for infection than the
families of infants colonized with S. aureus that were not
cloud babies. In spite of what was believed to be a
revolutionary concept, no further observations about cloud
babies have been published since Eichenwald’s study in 1960.
In 1986 we reported that an S. aureus nasal carrier, a
nurse, caused outbreaks in two newborn nurseries at different
hospitals in association with upper respiratory infections
(34). The nurse’s strain of S. aureus and the outbreak strains
were identical by phage typing. Infants’ risk for acquiring
staphylococcal skin disease was fivefold greater when the
nurse had a upper respiratory infection. She was treated with
topical bacitracin ointment and hexachlorophene baths to
eradicate her S. aureus carrier state, and no further
outbreaks of staphylococcal skin disease occurred. We
postulated then that the probable source of the outbreak
might be a cloud adult (4).
In 1996, an outbreak of methicillin-resistant S. aureus
(MRSA) pneumonia occurred in an intensive care unit (33).
Multivariant analysis demonstrated that the only indepen-
dent risk factors for MRSA pneumonia were intubation and
exposure to a single physician, who was nasally colonized
with the outbreak strain of MRSA as shown by molecular
typing. During the outbreak period, this physician had a
Table 2. Hospital group A streptococcal outbreaks suggesting airborne
transmission by asymptomatic health-care workers
Infected
   Health-care Source of   Patient patients
Reference        worker   GASa,b population   (no.)
McKee (14,15) Attendant Rectum Gynecologic 11
Schaffner (16) Anesthesiologist Rectum Surgical 20
Berkelman (17) OR nurse Vagina Surgical 10
Mastro (18) OR technician Scalp Surgical 20
aGAS air cultures were all positive
bGAS = Group A Streptococcus, OR = operating room243 Vol. 7, No. 2, March–April 2001 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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prolonged upper respiratory infection, and an experimental
rhinovirus upper respiratory infection caused him to increase
airborne dispersal of S. aureus 40-fold and become a cloud
adult. The use of a mask during this experimental rhinovirus
infection caused a 75% reduction in the airborne dispersal of
S. aureus.
To a hospital epidemiologist, the identification of two
cloud adults as the cause of the only two tightly clustered
S. aureus outbreaks investigated during his career is either a
striking coincidence or an indication that the frequency with
which airborne transmission plays a role in S. aureus
outbreaks has been underestimated. Many hospital out-
breaks of S. aureus infections have been reported that were
thought to be due to a single health-care worker (32-35,37-52).
A few of these were probably related to heavy skin
colonization (32) or sinusitis (35), but in most cases no other
risk factor was apparent that could account for these persons’
being capable of causing an outbreak. The role of airborne
transmission was investigated in only two studies (32,33). In
the group without identifiable risk factors, virtually all the
health-care workers were nasally colonized with S. aureus.
Indeed, S. aureus nasal colonization in health-care workers is
quite common (20% to 90%) (53-56). However, if S. aureus
nasal colonization was the only factor necessary to cause an
outbreak, the high frequency of S. aureus nasal colonization
in health-care workers should be associated with a high
frequency of S. aureus outbreaks. Since this is not the case,
some other factor(s) must modify the S. aureus nasal carrier
state to facilitate the outbreak. One such factor is likely a
viral upper respiratory infection. Since adults have an
average of two viral upper respiratory infections each year
(57), cloud adults may be working around patients all year.
We recently investigated the generalizability of the cloud
adult phenomenon by giving six persistent nasal carriers of
S. aureus a rhinovirus infection (58). One of the six volunteers
became an unequivocal cloud adult, with a 40-fold increase in
S. aureus airborne dispersal that could be blocked by a mask.
Another volunteer had a similar increase in airborne
dispersal, but it could not be prevented by a mask. The six
volunteers came from a group of 18 persistent nasal carriers of
S. aureus identified from 95 volunteers screened for S. aureus
nasal carriage. These findings suggest that the ability to
become a cloud adult could occur with a frequency of up to 6%
or more in the general population.
Viral upper respiratory infections facilitate the transmis-
sion of other bacterial infections, including the following
pathogens that colonize the nose: S. pneumoniae, S. pyogenes,
H. influenzae, and N. meningitidis (59-62). Thus, cloud adults
have the potential to play a role in the transmission of other
organisms and might be involved with some of the explosive
outbreaks of infection occasionally seen in day-care centers,
homeless shelters, the military, and hospitals. Further work
is necessary to understand the importance of cloud adults in
the transmission of hospital infections.
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